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COMMENTS
EXTENDING THE YOUNGER
ABSTENTION DOCTRINE TO STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS:
WILLIAMS v. RED BANK BOARD OF
EDUCATION
The abstention doctrine enables a federal court, under certain
circumstances, to decline the exercise of jurisdiction notwithstand-
ing that a case is properly before it.1 In Younger v. Harris,2 the
Supreme Court, relying upon the tenet that comity commands re-
I County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashudo Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959). The abstention
doctrine may be invoked only when significant interests exist which countervail a court's
duty to adjudicate a case that is properly before it. Id. at 188-89. Because of the diversity of
these interests, the federal abstention doctrine appears in a variety of forms and is em-
ployed after consideration of a number of factors, including "the desirability of avoiding
unseemly conflict between two sovereignties, the unnecessary impairment of state functions,
and the premature determination of constitutional questions." Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S.
219, 224 (1959). One type of abstention had its genesis in the case of Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Pullman abstention is invoked when a claim that particu-
lar state action is unconstitutional turns upon unsettled questions of state law. Id. at 500-01.
This type of abstention is premised upon the reluctance of federal courts to decide issues
which could be displaced by subsequent state adjudications. Id. A federal court should re-
frain from passing upon a constitutional issue when resolution of such issue would be ren-
dered unnecessary by a state court's construction of a particular state law. See Clay v. Sun
Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960). It does not follow, however, that Pullman absten-
tion should be applied simply because there is a "doubtful issue of state law," Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964), for application of the doctrine is in the wise discretion of
the court and should be resolved on a case-by-case basis, id.
A second type of abstention was recognized by the Supreme Court in Burford v. Sun Oil
Corp., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Pursuant to the Burford doctrine, abstention will be deemed
proper when a case is generated by the order of a state administrative agency, the case
concerns important and factually complex state policies, and a state court has demonstrated
particular expertise in the area at issue. Id. at 318-25, 331; Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 345-51 (1951). For further discussion of the different abstention
doctrines, see Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590 (1977); Com-
ment, The Abstention Doctrine: Is Pullman Dead in Federal Question Cases?, 30 BAYLOR L.
REV. 279 (1978); Comment, The Abstention Doctrine: Closing the Federal Forum: Juidice v.
Vail, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 1029, 1031-38 (1977).
2 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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spect for state functions,3 held that a federal court may abstain
from deciding a case where such adjudication would interfere with
pending state criminal proceedings.4 Subsequently, the Younger
' Comity is defined as one nation's respect, within its own territory, for the legislative,
executive, and judicial mandates of another nation. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64
(1895); McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of
Constitutional Protections, Part 1, 60 VA. L. REV. 1, 45 (1974). Pursuant to this principle,
the laws of a foreign country and the rights flowing therefrom will be enforced by a United
States court, Bostrom v. Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., 225 F. Supp. 222, 228 (N.D. Tex. 1963),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965), provided that the public policy of
the United States is not violated, Fleeger v. Clarkson Co., 86 F.R.D. 388, 392 (N.D. Tex.
1980); Sumitomo Corp. v. Parakopi Compania Maritima, S.A., 477 F. Supp. 737, 742
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), af'd, 620 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1980). Additionally, comity principles are impli-
cated when one state is asked to give effect to the laws of a sister state. See Gulf Collateral,
Inc. v. Morgan, 415 F. Supp. 319, 321 (S.D. Ga. 1976). The comity doctrine assumes a differ-
ent posture, however, when it is applied in the area of federal-state relations. In this con-
text, the doctrine is invoked out of "a proper respect for state functions," thereby enabling
each state to operate free of federal interference. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
Furthermore, principles of comity are invoked in the area of federal-state relations to deter-
mine "the availability and scope of equitable relief." Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379
(1976).
" 401 U.S. at 43-54. An examination of the history of Younger abstention must begin
with the maxim that a court of equity will not interfere with the enforcement of even an
unconstitutional state criminal statute. See In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 210 (1888). An ex-
ception to this rule developed, however, where "the circumstances are exceptional and the
danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate." Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S.
445, 452 (1927). In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), for example, the Supreme Court
indicated that federal equitable relief was available when a criminal proceeding under an
unconstitutional state statute was threatened rather than pending. Id. at 161-62. The next
major development in the evolution of Younger abstention occurred at the height of the
civil rights movement, when the Supreme Court decided the case of Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479 (1965). In Dombrowski, the plaintiffs sought federal injunctive relief against
enforcement of state criminal laws regulating Communists and subversive activities. Id. at
482. The Supreme Court, in granting the requested relief, reasoned that the threatened
prosecution not only was designed to harass plaintiffs and to discourage the exercise of con-
stitutionally protected rights, id. at 489-90, but also was to be brought under a statute which
was an overbroad limitation on first amendment activity, id. at 490-92. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court seemed to reaffirm the Dombrowski principle that a facially unconstitutional
statute is an appropriate justification for federal equitable relief. See Cameron v. Johnson,
390 U.S. 611, 615 (1968).
It is interesting to note that these various developments do not appear to create a prec-
edential basis for Younger abstention. What they do reflect, however, is the evolution of
federal law on the subject of federal court interference with state prosecutions. For a more
detailed discussion of the historical developments leading to Younger, see Maraist, Federal
Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger and Beyond, 50 Tax. L.
REV. 1324; 1325-32 (1972); Note, Implications of the Younger Cases For the Availability of
Federal Equitable Relief When No State Prosecution is Pending, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 874,
876-85 (1972); Comment, Federal Injunctive Relief: What Remains After Younger v. Har-
ris?, 60 Ky. L.J. 216, 218-20 (1971).
The Younger Court recognized that federal court abstention avoids duplicative proceed-
ings on the federal and state levels. 401 U.S. at 44. Such a proposition, the Court indicated,
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abstention rule was extended to include civil judicial proceedings 5
involving important state interests.' It has been unclear, however,
necessarily is premised upon a belief that state courts are adequate tribunals in which to
vindicate federal claims. Id.; accord, Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978). Notably, however, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that federal injunctive relief may be granted despite pending state prosecutions, but
only in certain exceptional circumstances. 401 U.S. at 46-54. One exigent circumstance is
when there exists a showing of irreparable injury which is "both great and immediate." Id.
at 46 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 246 (1926)). Another exigency occurs when a
statute is "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every
clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort
might be made to apply it." 401 U.S. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402
(1941)). Finally, a "showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance"
may justify such federal interference. 401 U.S. at 54. The same reasoning underlying the
imposition of federal injunctive relief has been applied to determine the propriety of a fed-
eral declaratory judgment during the pendency of state criminal proceedings. See Samuels
v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68-74 (1971); accord, Rosko v. Pagano, 466 F. Supp. 1364, 1371
(D.N.J. 1979).
1 Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443-44 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 333-
36 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 594 (1975). See generally Note, Federal
Intervention In State Court Proceedings: Expansion of the Younger Doctrine by Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 29 Sw. L.J. 636, 641-44 (1975) (implicating the expansion of Younger to all
civil proceedings). The Younger abstention doctrine initially was extended to pending state
civil proceedings in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). In Huffman, the state
brought a nuisance action to close a theatre showing obscene films. Id. at 598. Finding ab-
stention applicable, the Court reasoned that "the proceeding is both in aid of and closely
related to criminal statutes which prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials." Id. at
604. Consequently, interference with the state proceedings, observed the Court, would have
prevented the state from implementing its policies. Id. at 604-05.
The Younger abstention doctrine was extended further in Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
(1977), in which the Supreme Court held that the doctrine was applicable to a civil con-
tempt proceeding. Id. at 335. Juidice was significant in that it extended application of the
abstention principle beyond the criminal or quasi-criminal context. Id. Finally, the Court
applied abstention in Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977), wherein the Illinois De-
partment of Public Aid instituted a statutory attachment proceeding against a welfare re-
cipient who fraudulently concealed assets while receiving public assistance. Id. at 435-39.
Over claims that the statutory proceeding was unconstitutional, the Court held that absten-
tion was proper because there was a strong state interest in protecting the fiscal integrity of
public-assistance programs. Id. at 444.
' Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979); see Kenner v. Morris, 600 F.2d 22, 24 (6th
Cir. 1979). In Moore, the Supreme Court noted that Younger abstention was "fully applica-
ble" to state proceedings implicating important state interests. 442 U.S. at 423. While the
Younger doctrine was undergoing expansion into the civil setting, the Supreme Court was
emphatic in retaining the requirement that there be an important state interest. The
Younger decision itself presumably was premised upon a recognition that all criminal prose-
cutions were inherently significant state functions. See 401 U.S. at 43-44. The Huffman
Court applied the abstention doctrine to a civil proceeding which was in aid of and closely
related to the state's criminal laws, 420 U.S. at 604, and, therefore, premised the extension
upon the desire to protect the important interests which underlie those laws, id. at 604-05.
As the doctrine progressed further into the realm of civil proceedings, the Court reempha-
sized the requirement of an important state interest. 442 U.S. at 423; Trainor v. Hernandez,
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:711
whether a federal court may abstain from deciding a matter when
its determination would impact upon a pending state administra-
tive proceeding. Recently, in Williams v. Red Bank Board of Edu-
cation,' the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, further extending the
abstention doctrine, held that abstention properly may be applied
to prevent federal interference with pending state administrative
proceedings.8
In Williams, charges of professional misconduct were filed
against a tenured New Jersey schoolteacher.9 Although the charges
initially were instituted with the Red Bank Board of Education,
the case ultimately was referred to the New Jersey Office of Ad-
ministrative Law.10 During the pendency of the administrative pro-
ceeding, the now suspended schoolteacher commenced an action in
federal district court alleging that the dismissal proceeding was a
response to her exercise of first amendment rights."' Accordingly,
she sought an injunction against further prosecution in the state
proceeding, as well as damages and attorney's fees.1 2 The district
431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977). It should be observed that this abstention principle applies only if
the state is a party to the proceedings, Cassidy v. Virginia Carolina Veneer Corp., 652 F.2d
380, 383 (4th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Kelly, 583 F.2d 1242, 1249 (3d Cir. 1978), and the pro-
ceedings are not instituted by the state in bad faith or for purposes of harassment, 442 U.S.
at 432.
662 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1981).
8 Id. at 1013. Although cases other than Williams have applied Younger abstention to
state administrative proceedings, the Williams court was the first to render a detailed and
independent analysis of the issue. See note 39 and accompanying text infra.
' 662 F.2d at 1010. Three charges were filed against Portia Williams, a New Jersey
teacher. Id. at 1010-11. The first charge alleged that Williams struck students with a ruler,
thereby violating a New Jersey statute forbidding corporal punishment of pupils. Id. at
1010. The second charge alleged that Williams acted unprofessionally by questioning in
front of the entire class the cleanliness and health habits of a student. Id. Finally, the third
and most significant charge accused Williams of making anti-Semitic remarks at a Board of
Education public meeting. Id. Her behavior allegedly constituted conduct unbecoming an
employee of the Board. Id.
' Id. After the charges were filed with the Red Bank Board of Education, the matter
was referred to the New Jersey State Commissioner of Education who, in turn, referred the
charges to the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law. Id.
"1 Id. at 1010-11. Williams brought the federal action against the Board of Education
and the State Commissioner of Education pursuant to section 1983, which provides that
anyone who causes damages to another person while acting under color of state law shall be
liable in a civil suit for damages or other proper relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III
1979). Based upon her claim that the disciplinary proceedings were retaliatory, Williams
sought a declaration that her right of free speech had been violated, an injunction against
further administrative proceedings, an order that her personnel file be expunged of any re-
cord of the charges, and an award of constitutional damages and attorney's fees. 662 F.2d at
1011.
12 662 F.2d at 1011. Section 1983 allows a court, in its discretion, to award reasonable
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court, applying the Younger doctrine, dismissed the action,13 find-
ing that the state's interest in disciplining teachers was important
enough to permit abstention. 14
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
agreed that abstention was warranted, 5 but vacated and remanded
the district court's order on other grounds."6 Writing for an undi-
vided panel, Judge Garth stated that the abstention inquiry should
focus upon the importance of the state interest involved, rather
than upon the nature, judicial or administrative, of the state pro-
ceeding.17 Recognizing that states often implement important poli-
attorney's fees to the prevailing party, other than the United States, in a section 1983 suit.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
11 502 F. Supp. 1366, 1371 (D.N.J. 1980), vacated and remanded, 662 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir.
1981).
,1 502 F. Supp. at 1369-70. The district court determined the propriety of abstention by
recognizing a state's strong interest in regulating its public school system. Id. at 1369. The
procedural safeguards afforded a New Jersey schoolteacher against whom charges are
brought were noted by the court as demonstrating the importance of the interest involved.
Id. Indeed, the court believed that a refusal to abstain presented a dangerous potential for
interfering with the state's legitimate right to discipline teachers. Id. at 1370. Significantly,
the absence of pending state judicial proceedings was not found to be a factor militating
against the invocation of the Younger abstention doctrine. Id. Accordingly, the district court
summarily treated the fact that the pending state proceedings were administrative by noting
that Williams could appeal, as of right, to the New Jersey courts from an adverse adminis-
trative determination. Id.
" 662 F.2d at 1013.
10 Id. at 1023-24. Although the Third Circuit determined that the district court prop-
erly abstained, it nevertheless vacated the lower court's order of dismissal and reinstated
part of Williams' complaint. Id. The reinstatement related to the claims that Williams could
not assert in the state administrative proceeding, namely, the claims for constitutional dam-
ages and attorney's fees. Id. at 1024. Since this relief could not be granted in the state
administrative proceeding, the court was unable to justify dismissal of that portion of the
complaint. Id. at 1023. The proper course of action, therefore, was held to be retention of
jurisdiction over the claims that could not be resolved in the administrative forum. Id. All
federal proceedings on these issues, however, were to be stayed until there was a final ad-
ministrative determination. Id. at 1023-24.
17 Id. at 1015-17. In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), the concepts of federalism and
comity were invoked to deny federal equitable relief against a state executive department
practice. Id. at 379-80. Following an alleged pattern of unconstitutional treatment by police
officers, the respondents sought equitable relief in federal district court under section 1983.
Id. at 370. The district court observed that police department procedures tended to discour-
age the filing of civilian complaints, and thus, provided inadequate discipline for police mis-
conduct. Id. at 368-69. This finding resulted in the district court directing the Police Com-
missioner and the City Manager to draft a comprehensive program for dealing adequately
with civilian complaints. Id. at 369-70. On appeal from the Third Circuit's affirmance of the
lower court's decision, the Supreme Court reversed, focusing upon the relationship between
the federal judiciary and state governments. The Court reasoned that the concept of feder-
alism was applicable notwithstanding that equitable relief was being sought against a prac-
tice of the executive branch of a state government. Id. at 379-81. The Rizzo case appears to
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cies through administrative regulation,18 the court reasoned that
the comity considerations underlying the Younger doctrine pre-
cluded an outright refusal to abstain.19 Although the court favored
federal abstention when "strong and compelling state interests"
are at stake,20 it nevertheless noted that abstention will be proper
only if the state administrative proceeding provides an adequate
forum in which to raise federal claims. 21 Furthermore, in holding
that the district court properly abstained, Judge Garth determined
that because a "substantial portion" of the relief being sought in
the federal court could be granted in the state proceeding, the lat-
ter was an adequate forum in which to vindicate federal claims.22
The court vacated the lower court's order of dismissal, however,
with respect to the claims for constitutional damages and attor-
ney's fees since such relief could not be awarded in the state ad-
ministrative action.23 Accordingly, the district court was ordered to
retain jurisdiction, and merely stay the federal proceeding until
provide a proper perspective on the role of federalism in our dual system of government.
Clearly, federalism is a concept that mandates a respect not merely for state courts but also
for state governments themselves. Just as the Rizzo Court was not overly concerned with
the executive-judicial distinction, the Williams court did not focus upon the distinction be-
tween administrative and judicial proceedings. Indeed, Rizzo applied federalism to prevent
federal judicial interference with the state executive branch, see id., while the Third Circuit
in Williams used federalism to avoid a federal injunction against a state administrative pro-
ceeding, see 662 F.2d at 1017. It is submitted, therefore, that the Williams court simply has
adhered to the federalistic respect for state government mandated by the Supreme Court in
Rizzo.
10 662 F.2d at 1016.
Id. at 1016-17.
20 Id. at 1017. The court determined that the state's interest in education was suffi-
ciently compelling to warrant application of the Younger abstention doctrine. Id. at 1018-19.
Indeed, states often implement important interests through administrative bodies. New
York, for example, supervises and disciplines medical practitioners through the New York
State Board for Professional Medical Conduct. See Schachter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 36 (2d
Cir. 1978). Similarly, Alabama regulates the licensing of optometrists through the Alabama
Board of Optometry. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 566 (1973).
21 662 F.2d at 1020. The requirement that the state proceeding be adequate to vindicate
federal claims is a fundamental element of Younger and its progeny. See 401 U.S. at 49.
Indeed, the Supreme Court, in the Juidice decision, reiterated the necessity of adequate
state proceedings. 430 U.S. at 337. Thus, when the Williams panel extended the Younger
doctrine to state administrative proceedings, it maintained the requirement that the state
proceedings be adequate. 662 F.2d at 1020.
2 662 F.2d at 1022. Williams sought various forms of relief from the federal court. See
note 11 supra. Assuming that the disciplinary action was in retaliation to the exercise of
Williams' first amendment rights, the only relief that she could not be granted in the state
proceeding would be constitutional damages and attorney's fees. Id. at 1023.
23 662 F.2d at 1023-24; see note 22 supra.
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completion of the state action.24
The question of whether Younger abstention should be ex-
tended to prevent federal interference with state administrative
proceedings has resulted in a body of inconsistent case law.25 Two
Supreme Court decisions have contributed to the uncertainty in
this area. In Geiger v. Jenkins,2 for example, a physician at-
tempted to enjoin the enforcement of a state statutory licensing
procedure.27 The federal district court, relying upon the federal
anti-injunction statute,2 rather than upon the Younger doctrine,
denied relief because state judicial and administrative proceedings
were pending.29 The Supreme Court, citing Younger, summarily af-
24 662 F.2d at 1023. Because abstention usually has the effect of denying all federal
relief, the Williams court noted that dismissal typically is the proper course for the federal
court to follow. Id. at 1022. As an illustration, the court posited a situation where the federal
plaintiff seeks an injunction against state criminal prosecutions. Id. In such a circumstance,
if the federal court abstains, the state trial will proceed. Id. at 1022-23. After the state
proceeding has terminated, however, an injunction against prosecution of the state action is
meaningless. Id. at 1023. Therefore, dismissal is proper at the time of abstention because it
is at that stage that the federal court's role has come to an end. Id. at 1023.
25 See notes 37-43 and accompanying text infra.
28 316 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
27 316 F. Supp. at 371. Charges against the doctor seeking revocation of his license were
filed with the State Board of Medical Examiners of Georgia. Id. The doctor subsequently
brought an action in federal district court seeking an injunction against enforcement of the
state licensing statute on the ground that it was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id.
at 372.
28 Id. at 372; see 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). Section 2283 provides that "[a] court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). For a discussion of the "ex-
pressly authorized" exception to the anti-injunction rule, see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 228-43 (1972). Section 2283 manifests the public policy, relied upon by Younger, that
state adjudications should proceed free from federal court interference. See 401 U.S. at 43.
The Younger abstention doctrine, however, is a consideration, separate and apart, from the
applicability of section 2283. Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291, 300 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980). Thus, there appears to be a two-level inquiry when a
federal court injunction is sought against a state proceeding. The first level deals with sec-
tion 2283, while the second level deals with the Younger abstention considerations. See
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. at 229-30.
29 316 F. Supp. at 374. The federal district court denied the injunction because state
proceedings were pending before the state courts and the Board of Medical Examiners of
Georgia. Id. at 372. The court based its refusal to grant injunctive relief upon the anti-
injunction statute. Id. at 372-73; see note 28 and accompanying text supra. At the time the
district court decided Geiger, the Supreme Court had not yet rendered the Younger deci-
sion. Younger was decided, however, by the time Geiger reached the Supreme Court. Hence,
the timing of these two cases explains why the district court in Geiger did not rely upon
Youngel in denying the injunction.
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firmed.30 Thus, although the Geiger affirmance may be based upon
the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings, 31 the precise ration-
ale for the Court's determination has remained "somewhat
opaque."32
Subsequently, in Gibson v. Berryhil,3 a group of optometrists
sought a federal injunction against a state license revocation pro-
ceeding. 4 The Supreme Court held that since institutional bias
rendered the administrative proceeding inadequate, the district
court's refusal to abstain was proper.35 Implicit in this reliance
upon the inadequacy of the particular state proceeding is the no-
tion that it is proper to abstain in favor of adequate administrative
proceedings.3 "
3' Geiger v. Jenkins, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
3' The Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Geiger is problematic in that it does
not explain why Younger was controlling. As has been noted, the Geiger case involved state
proceedings which were pending at both the judicial and administrative levels. See note 29
supra. It appears unclear, therefore, how much weight the Geiger court attached to the fact
that proceedings were pending in the state courts. Certainly, there was no indication that
the Supreme Court would have affirmed by mere citation to Younger had the state proceed-
ings merely been administrative. See 401 U.S. at 985. It is submitted that the affirmance
may have been based solely upon the fact that the pending state proceedings were quasi-
criminal. See 316 F. Supp. at 372. This explanation is supported by the fact that the early
extensions of the Younger doctrine into the civil area were premised upon the criminal na-
ture of the state civil proceedings. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
31 See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 576 (1973). In Gibson, the Supreme Court
characterized the Geiger holding as "somewhat opaque," indicating that such uncertain sta-
tus resulted from the Court's summary affirmance of that case. Id. Thus, whatever import
Geiger may have had at the time of the summary affirmance, the Court clearly was accord-
ing it little weight at the time of the Gibson decision. This may be inferred from the lan-
guage in Gibson stating that the applicability of Younger to state civil proceedings was an
open question. Id. at 575-76. In the interests of clarity, it should be observed that Gibson
was decided prior to Huffman, Trainor, and the other cases extending Younger into the
realm of civil proceedings. See note 5 supra.
s 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
Id. at 568. The unprofessional conduct charges against the optometrists, which
stemmed from the acceptance of employment in a corporation, were filed by the Alabama
Optometric Association. Id. at 567. The proceedings were to be held before the Alabama
Board of Optometry, an agency with the authority to revoke licenses. Id. While the charges
were pending, however, the optometrists filed suit in federal district court seeking an injunc-
tion against the proceedings on the ground that they were violative of due process. Id. at
568-69.
35 Id. at 578-79. The Court determined that a possibility of bias existed because the
Board, before whom the administrative proceedings were pending, had a financial stake in
the outcome of the controversy. Id. Specifically, the members of the Board, who were op-
tometrists themselves, would experience an increase in business if the optometrists charged
with unprofessional conduct had their licenses revoked. Id. at 578.
36 Cf. Grandco Corp. v. Rochford, 536 F.2d 197, 206 (7th Cir. 1976) (abstention is inap-
propriate when the administrative proceeding is not pending before an established adjudica-
19821 YOUNGER ABSTENTION
The confusion engendered by the Supreme Court's failure to
address definitively the issue of whether abstention should ever be
extended to administrative proceedings is apparent from several
lower federal court decisions.3 7 Courts in the Second Circuit, for
example, have determined that abstention in favor of state admin-
istrative proceedings is proper.38 These courts have not developed
an independent basis of analysis, but rather, have adopted the du-
bious Geiger/Gibson rationales.39 In contrast, there is authority for
the proposition that federal courts should not abstain when the
tory body and state court review is a limited examination on the record).
'7 Compare McCune v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152, 1158 (2d Cir. 1975) (Younger could be
applied to administrative proceedings) with Jamestown School Comm. v. Schmidt, 427 F.
Supp. 1338, 1344 (D.R.I. 1977) (Younger applies to state judicial proceedings only) and Pol-
lard v. Panora, 411 F. Supp. 580, 589 (D. Mass. 1976) (Younger is inapplicable to a statutory
administrative proceeding).
33 See McCune v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152, 1158 (2d Cir. 1975); Schachter v. Whalen, 445
F. Supp. 1376, 1380-81 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 581 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.
1978); Lang v. Berger, 427 F. Supp. 204, 214-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
3 See McCune v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152, 1158 (2d Cir. 1975). In McCune, disciplinary
charges were brought against a police officer for violating a departmental grooming regula-
tion. Id. at 1153. Based upon his claim that the regulation was unconstitutional, the officer
commenced an action in federal district court. Id. The district court temporarily restrained
the state proceeding and ultimately enjoined enforcement of the regulation. Id. at 1154.
Remanding the case, the Second Circuit instructed the district court to consider the appli-
cability of Younger to the disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 1157. Clearly, the Second Circuit
did not determine the applicability of Younger to the proceedings in McCune because, at
the time of the district court's decision, Huffman had not yet been decided. The McCune
court noted, however, that Geiger established that administrative proceedings could present
a proper case for abstention since a judicial forum was not a "pre-requisite" for application
of Younger. Id. at 1158.
In Lang v. Berger, 427 F. Supp. 204, 214-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the court relied upon
McCune to reach a similar conclusion. In Lang, the plaintiff was a physician who was dis-
qualified from New York's Medicaid program for allegedly submitting undocumented in-
voices and giving improper prescriptions. Id. at 207-08. During the pendency of the state
hearing the physician commenced an action in federal district court alleging violations of his
constitutional rights. Id. at 207-09. The district court, relying on McCune, denied equitable
relief on the ground that federal courts must respect state administrative proceedings as
well as state judicial proceedings. Id. at 214-15.
Finally, in Schachter v. Whalen, 445 F. Supp. 1376, 1380-81 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd per
curiam on other grounds, 581 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978), the court cited Gibson and Geiger as
authority for abstaining during the pendency of state administrative proceedings. 445 F.
Supp. at 1380. In Schachter, a doctor sought to enjoin professional misconduct proceedings
pending before the New York State Board for Professional Medical Conduct. Id. at 1378.
This administrative body served the doctor with a subpoena duces tecum directing him to
furnish the medical records of people whom he treated with laetrile. Id. at 1379. The court
held that "the state interests at issue... [were] substantial and certainly sufficient to enti-
tle the medical disciplinary proceedings to the deference afforded by the doctrine of absten-
tion." Id. at 1381.
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pending state proceeding is administrative.40 Like the authorities
that favor abstention in this context, however, the analytical bases
for these pronouncements are unpersuasive. For instance, some
courts have relied blindly upon the assertion that Younger and its
progeny apply only to judicial proceedings. 41 Notably, one tribunal
even refused to abstain upon the ground that the administrative
proceeding was unrelated to the state's criminal laws. 42 It is sug-
gested that reliance upon this rationale fails to consider that
Younger abstention has been applied to state judicial proceedings
where important state interests, other than criminal, were
involved.43
40 E.g., Jamestown School Comm. v. Schmidt, 427 F. Supp. 1338, 1344 (D.R.I. 1977);
Clark v. Weeks, 414 F. Supp. 703, 707 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Pollard v. Panora, 411 F. Supp. 580,
588-89 (D. Mass. 1976); Hodory v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 408 F. Supp. 1016,
1020 (N.D. Ohio 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 431 U.S. 471 (1977); see Rite Aid Corp. v.
Board of Pharmacy, 421 F. Supp. 1161, 1167 (D.N.J. 1976), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 951
(1977).
4 Jamestown School Comm. v. Schmidt, 427 F. Supp. 1338, 1344 (D.R.I. 1977); Hodory
v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 408 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (N.D. Ohio 1976), reo'd on
other grounds, 431 U.S. 471 (1977). In Jamestown, two town school committees refused to
adhere to a Rhode Island statute requiring that town school committees provide transporta-
tion for students to regionalized sectarian schools within a 15 mile radius. 427 F. Supp. at
1342. The supposed justification for this refusal was that adherence to the statutory man-
date would violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. Id. The Commissioner
of Education determined, however, that the committees had a duty to transport the chil-
dren. Id. While the Commissioner's decision was on appeal to the Board of Regents, the
school committees brought an action in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief. Id. at 1340-43. Notwithstanding the claim that Younger abstention should be
applied due to the pendency of the Board of Regents proceeding, the court tersely stated
that "the policies which the comity doctrine seeks to vindicate are implicated only when
federal courts interfere with state judicial proceedings." Id. at 1344 (emphasis in original)
(citing Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)).
The Hodory court was equally vague in reaching a similar conclusion. In that case, a
steelworker was denied unemployment benefits pursuant to an Ohio statute. 408 F. Supp. at
1018. While his administrative appeal was pending, a suit was commenced in federal district
court. Id. Although recognizing that the Younger doctrine had been extended to civil pro-
ceedings, the court nevertheless found that "the Supreme Court in Huffman made it clear
that its holding was limited to the enjoining of ongoing state-initiated judicial proceedings."
408 F. Supp. at 1019-20 (emphasis in original).
" See Rite Aid Corp. v. Board of Pharmacy, 421 F. Supp. 1161, 1167 (D.N.J. 1976),
appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 951 (1977). The Rite Aid court stated that the abstention princi-
ples of Younger and Huffman do not apply to ordinary state agency proceedings "where a
criminal nexus is absent." 421 F. Supp. at 1167. The precedential value of this case, how-
ever, has been diminished by subsequent decisions which have applied Younger in situa-
tions further removed from criminal enforcement. See note 43 infra.
"' See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 434-35 (1979) (state child custody proceeding);
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (state civil enforcement action brought by
state in sovereign capacity); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977) (state contempt proce-
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Amid the disagreement prevailing in the lower federal courts,
the Williams panel unequivocally has proclaimed that Younger ab-
stention can be applied to state administrative proceedings. 4 It is
submitted that this novel application of the abstention doctrine is
consistent with the concept of comity upon which the Younger de-
cision itself is premised.45 In its broadest sense, the notion of com-
ity, as applied in the abstention area, demands that federal courts
defer not merely to state courts, but rather to the states them-
selves.46 Hence, if important state interests are involved in an ad-
ministrative action, the concept of comity would appear to support
a federal court's decision to defer to the state proceeding, pro-
vided, of course, that the state agency is an adequate forum in
which to determine the federal claims that have been raised.7
dures); Kenner v. Morris, 600 F.2d 22, 24 (6th Cir. 1979) (state contempt proceedings de-
spite alleged unconstitutionality of alimony statute); Gipson v. New Jersey Supreme Court,
558 F.2d 701, 704 (3d Cir. 1977) (state attorney disciplinary proceedings); Anonymous v.
Association of the Bar, 515 F.2d 427, 433-34 (2d Cir.) (state attorney disciplinary proceed-
ings), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975). But see Cicero v. Olgiati, 410 F. Supp. 1080, 1090
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (refusal to abstain in favor of state parole system).
" 662 F.2d at 1013. The Williams court noted that despite indications that Younger
should be applied to state administrative proceedings, it had never been so held. Id. at 1013-
14. Abstention in favor of state administrative actions had been practiced prior to Williams,
however, by the Second Circuit. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra. Since these
Second Circuit decisions were supported rather anemically by Gibson and Geiger, see notes
26-36 and accompanying text supra, it appears that the Williams decision is the first case to
abstain in favor of administrative proceedings after independent analysis.
15 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Subsequent cases have also recognized
the vital role that comity plays in the Younger abstention doctrine. See Trainor v. Her-
nandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977); Huffman v. Pur-
sue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601 (1975).
4' The Younger opinion defined comity as
[a] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance
of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways.
401 U.S. at 44 (emphasis added). This expansive view of the comity principle is supported
by the Supreme Court's decision in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), in which the Court
held that principles of federalism which govern "the relationship between federal courts and
state governments" apply when injunctive relief is sought against "an executive branch of
an agency of state or local governments." Id. at 380.
47 See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. at 337. An argument premised upon the inherent differ-
ences between judicial and administrative forums, see note 50 infra, may be raised against
the application of the Younger doctrine to state administrative proceedings. Such a position
necessarily involves an assertion that the quality of adjudication in an administrative pro-
ceeding is inferior to that in a judicial proceeding. It is submitted, however, that this posi-
tion is not supported by the case law. Assuming that administrative proceedings are inferior,
Younger abstention nevertheless may be proper since invocation of the doctrine only re-
1982]
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Although the Williams decision appears to be well reasoned,
the extension of the Younger doctrine to the administrative area
raises a procedural difficulty, namely, the collateral estoppel effect
of the administrative determination.4 Despite the uncertain collat-
eral estoppel effect of administrative factual determinations upon
subsequent civil litigatione it should be observed that there is a
quires that the pending proceeding be an adequate forum for the federal plaintiff to present
his federal claim. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. at 425; Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. at 337. This
analysis apparently has been recognized by the courts. See Grandco Corp. v. Rochford, 536
F.2d 197, 206 (7th Cir. 1976). In Grandco, the pending state administrative proceeding in-
volved a licensing determination made pursuant to a hearing before an appointee of the
mayor. Id. State court review of his decision involved only a very limited examination of the
administrative record. Id. In finding abstention inappropriate, the court noted that "the
state proceedings [were] not before a court or any established adjudicatory body." Id. (em-
phasis added). Clearly, this holding was not based upon the obvious fact that the state pro-
ceeding was inferior to a federal court proceeding, but rather, upon the federal plaintiff's
inability to raise his federal claims in the state proceeding. See id. Similarly, in Plano v.
Baker, 504 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit held that an administrative proceed-
ing was inadequate where the testimony of witnesses expressly was forbidden and no proce-
dure for the determination of factual issues was available. Id. at 598. Although the Plano
case did not deal specifically with Younger abstention, it is helpful in that it addressed the
analogous area of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id. The holding, therefore, pro-
vides some insight into the meaning of the term "adequate proceedings." In any event, the
language of Younger and its progeny, as well as the foregoing case discussions, appear to
suggest that an administrative proceeding can be an adequate forum notwithstanding that
in some respects it may be "inferior" to a judicial proceeding.
48 See 662 F.2d at 1022. The distinctions between the discrete concepts of collateral
estoppel and res judicata have generated much confusion. The doctrine of res judicata pro-
vides that when a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits
of a cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies are barred from instituting a
second suit based upon the same cause of action. Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349
U.S. 322, 326 (1955); 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405[1], at 622-24 (2d ed. 1982). In
contrast, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the parties to a cause of action from reliti-
gating, in a suit based upon a different cause of action, factual issues that were determined
in the original suit. McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 983 (1981); 1B J. MOORE, supra 0.405[1], at 622-24.
The Williams court referred to res judicata in its discussion of the potential preclusive
effect of state administrative proceedings. 662 F.2d at 1022. It is submitted that the
Williams court may have confused the concepts of collateral estoppel and res judicata. The
claim for constitutional damages was the only claim that could not be raised in the adminis-
trative proceeding, and the only claim which Williams later would be allowed to raise in
federal court. Id. at 1023-24. It would appear, then, that if a claim cannot be presented in a
particular proceeding, res judicata will not bar litigation of that claim in a subsequent ac-
tion. The plaintiff in Williams raised the possibility of being precluded from relitigating
factual issues relevant to both the administrative proceeding and any subsequent federal
action for constitutional damages. Id. at 1022. Thus, it appears that the plaintiff was refer-
ring to the collateral estoppel effect which the administrative findings of fact would have in
a subsequent federal court suit.
"' The collateral estoppel and res judicata effects of state administrative proceedings
upon a subsequent civil rights action brought under section 1983 of title 42, see note 11
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legitimate possibility that a federal plaintiff may be collaterally es-
topped from relitigating the factual issues of a constitutional claim
in federal court, since a federal claim frequently hinges upon the
identical factual questions resolved in an administrative proceed-
ing.5O It is suggested that any collateral estoppel effect which may
attach to administrative fact findings subsequent to the exercise of
Williams abstention can be avoided by analogy to the type of ab-
stention practiced in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.51 Pull-
man abstention enables a federal court to refrain from determining
the constitutionality of state action if resolution of such issues
supra, are not absolutely clear. Boykins v. Ambridge Area School Dist., 621 F.2d 75, 80 (3d
Cir. 1980); see Doe v. Anker, 451 F. Supp. 241, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
986 (1980); 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
4253, at 568 (1978). There is some authority, however, that collateral estoppel and res judi-
cata attach to state court determinations in a subsequent action based upon section 1983.
New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764, 774 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 894
(1978); Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1978); Schiavulli v. Aubin, 504 F.
Supp. 483, 485 (D.R.I. 1980).
10 Although Younger abstention in the face of pending state administrative proceedings
is proper despite the possibility that these proceedings may be somewhat inferior to a judi-
cial forum, see note 47 supra, it is understandable that a federal plaintiff would not want
factual issues underlying his constitutional claim to be finally determined in the administra-
tive setting. It is submitted that this is due, at least in part, to intangible considerations.
The adjudication of constitutional questions traditionally has been afforded a special posi-
tion in our judicial heritage. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 390-92 (1947). Despite the
proclaimed equality of competence between federal and state courts, many civil liberties
litigators prefer to have constitutional claims decided before a federal tribunal. See
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1115-16 _(1977). One of the reasons
advanced for this penchant is that the relatively small number of judges on the federal
bench enables that court to maintain a higher degree of technical competence than is possi-
ble in state court. Id. at 1121-22. If in fact state courts are less preferable than federal
courts, then it would follow that state administrative tribunals are also less preferable.
Furthermore, a plaintiff would not want factual issues underlying a constitutional claim
to be determined administratively because often the rules of evidence followed by state ad-
ministrative agencies are more lenient than those employed by the courts. See, e.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 5-709 (1947); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11513 (West Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 4-178 (West Supp. 1981); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A § 11 (West 1979); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 15.0419 (West Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.070 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
Hence, it is submitted that federal court abstention in favor of state administrative proceed-
ings may preclude a federal plaintiff from having the factual issues relating to his constitu-
tional claim determined by rules of evidence that are more objective and formalistic.
Although these deficiencies would not make an administrative proceeding "inadequate"
in the sense that Younger abstention would be inappropriate, see note 47 supra, they do
raise interesting problems if preclusive effect is to be given to the administrative proceeding
when the federal plaintiff returns to federal court. Given the importance of constitutional
adjudication, it is proposed that the factual issues underlying such adjudication should be
resolved by a federal court receptive to constitutional delicacies, rather than an administra-
tive body concerned with achieving the objectives for which it was created.
51 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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turns upon unsettled questions of state law.2 Typically, in such a
situation, the federal court, by using the procedure employed by
the Williams court,53 will retain jurisdiction over the case and stay
the federal proceedings until the parties obtain a state court deter-
mination of the unsettled question of state law.5 4 The Supreme
Court, resolving the collateral estoppel question in the area of
Pullman abstention, has stated that "where. . . the primary fact
determination would have been by the District Court, a litigant
may not be unwillingly deprived of that determination" by appli-
cation of the abstention doctrine.55 When federal jurisdiction is in-
82 Id. at 499-501. Pullman involved an order of the Railroad Commission of Texas that
allegedly discriminated against blacks. Id. at 498. The Pullman Company brought an action
to enjoin enforcement of the order on the ground that it was, inter alia, violative of due
process. Id. The district court determined that the commission was without authority to
issue the order and, accordingly, granted the requested relief. Id. at 497-98. The Supreme
Court, however, held that the district court should have stayed the federal proceedings until
the Texas courts determined whether the commission had authority to issue the controver-
sial order. Id. at 500-01. The Court stated that a federal court can avoid "[deciding] an issue
by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication."
Id. at 500 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court frequently has ordered Pullman-type abstention in recent years.
See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1976); Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73, 78-79
(1976); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1970). Bellotti involved a Massachusetts stat-
ute that governed the type of consent required before an abortion could be performed on an
unmarried minor. 428 U.S. at 133-34. The day before the statute was to go into effect, the
plaintiffs commenced an action in federal district court seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief on fourteenth amendment grounds. Id. at 136. The Court held that abstention was
appropriate because the potential for statutory construction by the Massachusetts courts
would eliminate or modify the need for federal constitutional adjudication. Id. at 146-47. In
Reetz, the validity of certain Alaska fishing laws hinged upon an uninterpreted clause of the
Alaska Constitution. 397 U.S. at 85-87. It was held that the federal district court should
have abstained until the Alaska courts could give an authoritative construction to their state
constitution. Id. at 87. The Court noted that the purpose of the Pullman doctrine was "'the
avoidance of needless friction' between federal pronouncements and state policies." Id.
(quoting Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500). Similarly, the Carey decision held that abstention was
mandated because the challenged New York attachment statute conceivably could be given
a constitutional interpretation by the state courts. 425 U.S. at 78-79. Emphasis was placed
upon New York's need for continued utilization of the attachment statute. Id. at 79.
88 See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
See American Trial Lawyer's Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 409 U.S. 467, 469
(1973); Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 512-13 (1972).
88 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 417 (1964) (foot-
note omitted). The England Court noted that the possibility of appellate review by the
Supreme Court of state court decisions was not an adequate substitute for a full federal
adjudication of all the issues involved in a federal claim. Id. The Court held, therefore, that
if a party reserves his right to return to federal court after an order of abstention, the fed-
eral court will adjudicate the issues after the state court has acted. Id. at 421. This reserva-
tion, however, does not have to be explicit. Id. In order to lose the right to return to federal
court, the party must litigate fully all of his claims before the state court. Id.
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voked properly, the Court reasoned, a litigant should not be forced
to accept a state court determination of his constitutional claim.56
It is suggested that the rationale underlying the Court's reluctance
to accord collateral estoppel to the findings of a state judicial pro-
ceeding is even more persuasive when the state proceeding is ad-
ministrative in nature.57 Indeed, the proposed application of the
Pullman decision to the Williams situation insures that state func-
tions properly will be respected by abstention and that federal
plaintiffs will be afforded the opportunity to litigate fully their
constitutional claims in federal court.
CONCLUSION
To the extent that the Younger abstention doctrine is consid-
ered valid, the Williams court appears to have acted correctly by
ruling that federal abstention in favor of state administrative pro-
ceedings is proper. Undoubtedly, the notion of comity, relied upon
in Younger, requires more than federal court respect for state judi-
cial proceedings. Indeed, comity is a broad concept which man-
dates federal noninterference with state government itself. Addi-
tionally, the tangential problem of the collateral estoppel effect
which may attach to administrative factual findings subsequent to
federal court abstention can be avoided simply by application of
56 Id. at 415.
' There has been recent authority to the effect that England, see notes 55-56 and ac-
companying text supra, does not apply when abstention is premised upon Younger. Olitt v.
Murphy, 453 F. Supp. 354, 358 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 591 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 825 (1979). Olitt involved an attorney who was subjected to state bar disciplinary
proceedings. 453 F. Supp. at 355. Three times during the pendency of the state proceedings
the attorney commenced federal actions involving questions of constitutional dimension,
and the federal court abstained on Younger grounds on all three occasions. Id. Each time
the attorney reserved his rights under England. Id. at 357-58. The attorney ultimately was
suspended, whereupon he commenced a fourth federal action raising the identical constitu-
tional issues that he had raised in the state proceedings. Id. at 355-58. The federal court
found that the plaintiff's reliance on England was misplaced and that, therefore, his consti-
tutional claims were barred by res judicata. Id. at 358. The court stated that England was
implicated only when abstention was premised upon Pullman grounds in a situation where a
federal plaintiff was assured a return to federal court. Id. Thus, the court continued, when a
case was dismissed pursuant to Younger abstention, the England doctrine was inapplicable.
Id. It is submitted that the Olitt rationale does not preclude application of England to the
Williams situation. The Olitt decision took the restrictive view that Younger abstention
always contemplates dismissal. Id. The Williams court, however, retained jurisdiction over
the federal action. 662 F.2d at 1023. Thus, inasmuch as Younger abstention necessarily does
not require dismissal, it appears to resemble closely Pullman-type abstention. As a result,
England should be as applicable to those Younger cases where dismissal is not ordered as it
is to cases involving Pullman abstention.
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the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the area of
Pullman abstention. Adoption of this flexible approach will permit
a broad expansion of Younger abstention, and, concomitantly, pro-
tect the interests of individual federal litigants.
Carmine A. Reale
